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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3806 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
BORN ISLAM RUSH, 
                                   Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. No. 3-09-cr-00174-002) 
District Judge:  Honorable Anne E. Thompson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 17, 2016 
 
Before:  FUENTES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 23, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
  
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 On January 24, 2011, Born Islam Rush pleaded guilty to one count of possession 
with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.  
§ 841.  Prior to sentencing, the parties agreed that the appropriate base offense level 
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines would be 26 if the court relied on the  
drug quantity table, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(7) (Nov. 1, 2010).  The parties further agreed, 
however, that if the District Court designated Rush a “career offender”—as the pre-
sentence investigation report recommended—his base offense level would increase to 34.  
See id. § 4B1.1(b)(2).  In either case, Rush would be entitled to a three-level reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility and assistance with the investigation.  See id. § 3E1.1(b). 
 At sentencing, the District Court determined that Rush was a career offender, but 
varied downward and designated a base offense level of 23.  The court sentenced him to 
96 months’ imprisonment, a sentence toward the bottom of the Guidelines’ range (92-115 
months).   
 In November 2014, Rush submitted a letter to the District Court clerk asking to be 
“appointed counsel or referred to the office of legal counsel to be represented in the 
matter of all drugs minus 2 level amendment.”  (Lttr; ECF No. 43.)  The District Court 
characterized Rush’s request as a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to Amendment 
782,1 see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), and referred it to the Office of the Public Defender.  
Upon review, the Public Defender’s Office determined that Rush was not eligible for 
                                              
1 Amendment 782 to the Guidelines reduced by two levels the offense levels assigned to 
most drug quantities under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c).  See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) & app. C. 
supp., amends. 782, 788 (2014).   
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relief under § 3582(c)(2) because his Guidelines range was based on the career-offender 
Guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, not the drug-quantity table revised by Amendment 782, id. 
§ 2D1.1(c)(3).  The District Court agreed and denied Rush’s motion.   
 Rush moved for reconsideration, insisting that he had in fact been sentenced under 
§ 2D.1(c)(3).  Rush also objected to the District Court’s characterization of his motion for 
appointment of counsel to assist him in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings as a § 3582(c)(2) 
motion itself.   
 In light of Rush’s motion for reconsideration, the District Court directed the 
Defender’s Office to further explain the basis for its determination that Rush was 
sentenced as a career offender.  In response, the Defender’s Office stated that both the 
sentencing transcript and Probation Office’s Report of Sentence make clear that the 
sentencing court did not rely on the drug-quantity tables in § 2D1.1(c)(3).  The District 
Court agreed and denied Rush’s request for reconsideration.  The court did not address 
Rush’s complaint that it had mischaracterized his motion for appointment of counsel.  
 Rush then filed the motion at issue here, a § 3582(c)(2) motion labeled as such, 
again arguing that the court had mischaracterized his counsel motion, and again asking 
the court to grant him relief under § 3582(c)(2).  The District Court determined that Rush 
was procedurally barred from bringing this motion based on the law of the case doctrine.  
See Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 116 
(3d Cir. 1997) (“The law of the case doctrine directs courts to refrain from re-deciding 
issues that were resolved earlier in the litigation.”).  In applying the law-of-the-case 
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doctrine, the court recognized that reconsideration of a previously decided issue is 
warranted in certain extraordinary circumstances, see Bridge v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 981 
F.2d 97, 103 (3d Cir. 1992), and considered whether its decision to characterize Rush’s 
counsel motion constituted such an extraordinary circumstance, but concluded that it did 
not because Rush was not prejudiced in any way by the court’s action.  Rush now 
appeals. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In considering the denial of 
Rush’s § 3582(c)(2) motion, we exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines and otherwise review the denial of relief for 
abuse of discretion.  United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2009).  We may 
summarily affirm the District Court’s rulings if there is no substantial question presented 
on appeal.  3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.  We may affirm on any basis 
supported by the record.  See Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089 
n.10 (3d Cir. 1988).   
 Upon review, we agree with the District Court that Rush was not prejudiced by the 
District Court’s adjudication of his motions because he is not entitled to a reduction of 
sentence under Amendment 782.  Generally, a district court cannot “modify a term of 
imprisonment once it has been imposed” unless a defendant is eligible for a reduction of 
sentence pursuant to § 3582(c).  Section 3582(c)(2) allows for a reduction if: (1) the 
sentence was “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the 
Sentencing Commission;” and (2) “a reduction is consistent with applicable policy 
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statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); United States 
v. Flemming, 723 F.3d 407, 410 (3d Cir. 2013).  A reduction in sentence is not consistent 
with the relevant policy statement unless the amendment has “the effect of lowering the 
defendant’s applicable guideline range.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B).  The Sentencing 
Guidelines define “applicable guideline range” as “the guideline range that corresponds 
to the offense level and criminal history category determined pursuant to 1B1.1(a), which 
is determined before consideration of any departure provision in the Guidelines Manual 
or any variance.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A) (emphasis added).   
 Here, the applicable guideline range is “the range calculated pursuant to the career 
offender designation of § 4B1.1, and not the range calculated after applying any 
departure or variance.”  Flemming, 723 F.3d at 412.  As the District Court noted, the fact 
that Rush received a downward variance does not change the applicable guideline range 
under which his sentence was calculated.  Amendment 782, which alters the offense 
levels for drug crimes but does not affect the offense levels for career offenders, would 
not lower Rush’s applicable guidelines range, and it would thus be contrary to the 
applicable policy statement to reduce his sentence.  Accordingly, the District Court did 
not err in denying Rush’s motion pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). 
 Because this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm 
the District Court’s order.  See Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  
